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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Interpretation is a familiar feature of law and legal practice.  For some 
legal theorists, interpretation is a central—even foundational—aspect of 
law.  Despite many discussions of interpretation, in a variety of legal 
theoretical contexts, there remains widespread disagreement over the 
nature of interpretation in law.  It may well be that the reason interpretation 
remains a widely contested aspect of legal theory is that our very 
conception of what counts as law depends on a proper understanding of 
the role of interpretation in law. 
 *  Distinguished Professor of Law (Camden) and Philosophy (New Brunswick), 
Rutgers University.  My thanks to Kim Ferzan, Peter Hacker, Andrew Halpin, Patrick S. 
O’Donnell, and Jefferson White for comments on drafts of this Article. Justine Kasznica 
provided outstanding research assistance.  A version of this Article was presented to the 
Oxford University Legal Theory Discussion Group, Mind and Society (Manchester) and 
the law faculties at Southampton, Palermo and Luiss (Rome). 




I argue that interpretation is a parasitic activity in legal practice.  In 
other words, I want to disagree with those who make the case for 
interpretation as a basic or fundamental feature of law.1  While 
 1. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  I anticipate that some will 
take issue with my characterization of Dworkin’s interpretivism.  One version of this 
criticism is that Dworkin is not really making a semantic argument at all.  Rather, his 
claims are normative in nature and, thus, not susceptible to critique in the same manner 
as, say, Stanley Fish.  At a minimum, I think this is a contestable reading of the argument 
in LAW’S EMPIRE.  I will not make a sustained argument here because I have already 
made the case elsewhere.  See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 76–98 (1996).  I 
will, however, record my complete agreement with Gerald Postema’s characterization of 
a central problem with Dworkin’s argument.  See Gerald Postema, “Protestant” 
Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 LAW & PHIL. 283, 288–89 (1987) (“[W]hile 
[Dworkin] regards the activity of the practice [of law] as public and collective, he seems 
to regard the enterprise of understanding that activity as private and individual . . . .  I 
shall argue that Dworkin’s theory thus interpreted fails to describe adequately participant 
understanding of common social practices.”).  Dworkin leaves us in no doubt when it 
comes to the pervasive nature of interpretation in law.  For Dworkin, there is no in 
principle distinction between easy and hard cases: 
We have been attending mainly to hard cases, when lawyers disagree whether 
some crucial proposition of law is true or false.  But questions of law are 
sometimes very easy for lawyers and even for nonlawyers.  It “goes without 
saying” that the speed limit in Connecticut is 55 miles an hour and that people 
in Britain have a legal duty to pay for food they order in a restaurant.  At least 
this goes without saying except in very unusual circumstances.  A critic might 
therefore be tempted to say that the complex account we have developed of 
judicial reasoning under law as integrity is a method for hard cases only.  He 
might add that it would be absurd to apply the method to easy cases—no judge 
needs to consider questions of fit and political morality to decide whether 
someone must pay his telephone bill—and then declare that in addition to his 
theory of hard cases, Hercules needs a theory about when cases are hard, so he 
can know when his complex method for hard cases is appropriate and when 
not.  The critic will then announce a serious problem: it can be a hard question 
whether the case at hand is a hard case or an easy case, and Hercules cannot 
decide by using his technique for hard cases without begging the question. 
   This is a pseudoproblem.  Hercules does not need one method for hard cases 
and another for easy ones.  His method is equally at work in easy cases, but 
since the answers to the questions it puts are then obvious, or at least seem to 
be so, we are not aware that any theory is at work at all.  We think the question 
whether someone may legally drive faster than the stipulated speed limit is an 
easy one because we assume at once that no account of the legal record that 
denied that paradigm would be competent.  But someone whose convictions 
about justice and fairness were very different from ours might not find that 
question so easy; even if he ended by agreeing with our answer, he would 
insist that we were wrong to be so confident.  This explains why questions 
considered easy during one period become hard before they again become easy 
questions—with the opposite answers. 
DWORKIN, supra, at 353–54.  The problem with Dworkin is simple: he confuses the fact 
that it is always possible that someone will need an interpretation (i.e., an explanation 
that is usually given) with the false claim that we always interpret in order to understand.  
Cf. Nicos Stavropoulos, Interpretivist Theories of Law, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2003), at http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ 
win2003/entries/law-interpretivist (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (explaining that interpretivism 
is not fully determined by practice or values served by it). 
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interpretation is certainly an important element of legal practice, it is an 
activity that depends upon existing and widespread agreement among 
legal practitioners with respect to most features of legal practice.  In 
short, interpretation is not the firmament of law. 
I do not wish to deny that interpretation is an important aspect of the 
practice of law.  Rather, my aim is to clarify the role of interpretation in 
law.  But before we can begin to understand more clearly the nature of 
interpretation in law, we must first clarify the nature of understanding, 
for it is to understanding that interpretation owes its parasitic status.2
The need for interpretation arises from the firmament of praxis.  That 
is, interpretation in law arises from established forms of action that all 
participants recognize and employ whenever they make, appraise, and 
adjudicate claims about the state of the law.  Interpretation is grounded 
in a distinct form of discursive action that we recognize as legal in 
nature.  Thus, before we can truly understand the role of interpretation in 
law, we must first explicate the particular form of understanding we 
identify as legal. 
Only with a clear view of the nature of understanding in law can we 
then properly explicate the nature and scope of interpretation in law.  
When we look at how participants in law engage in interpretation, the 
activity can best be described by a few general principles.  These 
principles capture what it is that lawyers do when they, of necessity, 
interpret the law. 
This Article is divided into three principal parts.  In Part II, I reprise 
an argument that myself and others have made about the “logical” status 
of interpretation.  I add to the discussion of the role of interpretation in 
understanding by making the claim that interpretation is a parasitic 
activity, the efficacy of which is dependent upon understanding already 
being in place. 
 2. All interpretation presupposes understanding.  No one could interpret the 
following: Nog drik legi xfom.  The term first has to be translated (and, contra Quine, 
translation is not interpretation) or deciphered before interpretation takes place.  W.V. 
QUINE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 51–55 (1969).  We interpret an 
utterance when we choose between different ways of understanding it.  Legal interpretation 
is the activity of deciding which of several ways of understanding a given provision is 
the correct or preferable way of understanding.  This is precisely the sort of activity 
Wittgenstein has in mind when he writes: “we ought to restrict the term ‘interpretation’ 
to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.”  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 201 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958). 




In Part III, I explicate what it means to understand the law.  Again 
drawing on my earlier work,3 I explain that understanding law is a 
matter of being the master of a technique, specifically, a technique of 
argument.  I describe the forms of legal argument in detail and make the 
case that the use of these argumentative forms is the nerve of law. 
The forms of argument are central to any understanding of law and 
legal practice.  But the forms of argument conflict, and when they do, 
the need for interpretation arises.  Part IV contains a discussion of three 
cases that illustrate both the use of the forms of argument and the way in 
which their conflict requires interpretation.  I conclude that interpretation 
in law is best explained by three principles.  These are: minimal mutilation, 
coherence and generality.  When the forms of argument conflict, we 
must choose between competing resolutions of their conflict.  In my 
discussion of cases where the forms of argument conflict, I will show 
how the principles of interpretation that I identify provide a perspicuous 
account of what lawyers do when they interpret the law. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING IS NOT INTERPRETATION 
It has now become quite popular to explicate understanding in terms 
of interpretation.  Interpretivists believe that interpretation is the most 
perspicuous way to explicate or explain the phenomenon of human 
understanding.  Interpretation knows no disciplinary boundaries.  From 
philosophy to psychology to anthropology and the natural sciences, 
interpretation plays a central role in the explanation of human action. 
So, how do interpretivists account for the phenomenon of human 
understanding?  Interested as we are in law, consider the views of a 
leading proponent of interpretivism, Stanley Fish.  Fish developed the 
theory of Reader-Response Criticism—the idea that in the act of reading, 
the reader creates the meaning of the text.4  This view is a function or 
corollary of Fish’s general philosophical views about the nature of 
meaning, which he expresses thus: 
All shapes are interpretively produced, and since the conditions of interpretation 
are themselves unstable—the possibility of seeing something in a “new light,” and 
therefore of seeing a new something, is ever and unpredictably present—the 
shapes that seem perspicuous to us now may not seem so or may seem 
differently so tomorrow.  This applies not only to the shape of statutes, poems, 
and signs in airplane lavatories, but to the disciplines and forms of life within 
which statutes, poems, and signs become available to us.5
 3. See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 86–88 (explaining that understanding is the 
act of properly responding to a request). 
 4. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 21–67 (1980) (developing 
the theory of affective stylistics). 
 5. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND 
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In accounting for our understanding of statutes, poems, and airplane 
lavatory signs, Fish posits an act of interpretation interposed between the 
object of our understanding and our grasp of its meaning.  The interpretive 
act mediates between the thing we seek to understand and our grasp of 
its meaning.  Interpretation makes understanding possible.  Of course, 
there is often disagreement over the meaning of texts, especially legal 
texts.  Fish thinks that interpretation can account for this phenomenon.  
In accounting for the divergent perspectives of the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Riggs v. Palmer,6 Fish writes: 
[I]f it is assumed that the purpose of probate is to ensure the orderly devolution 
of property at all costs, then the statute in this case will have the plain meaning 
urged by the defendant; but if it is assumed that no law ever operates in favor of 
someone who would profit by his crime, then the “same” statute will have a 
meaning that is different, but no less plain.  In either case the statute will have 
been literally construed, and what the court will have done is prefer one literal 
construction to another by invoking one purpose (assumed background) rather 
than another.7
For Fish, interpretive assumptions are the bridge between a statutory 
text and our grasp of its meaning.  Interpretive assumptions mediate or 
make possible our grasp of the meaning of the New York Statute of 
Wills.  Without these interpretive assumptions, the requirements of the 
statute would elude us.  But, according to Fish, the interpretive assumptions 
of the majority and the dissent were different.  It is due to these 
differences in interpretive assumptions that the court divided on the 
question of the meaning of the rules articulated by the statute.  Thus, per 
Fish, interpretation not only accounts for human understanding, it 
accounts for disagreement in understanding as well. 
There is nothing in Fish’s account of either understanding or 
disagreement that can withstand scrutiny.  Fish’s signature move is the 
slide from the fact of interpretive dispute to the (false) conclusion that 
interpretive disputes are best explained by the “fact” that the disputants 
lack a common ground of understanding.  Explicating the common 
ground of understanding puts us on the road to a better understanding of 
interpretation. 
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 302 (1989). 
 6. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that a man could not 
receive his grandfather’s estate because the principle that no one should be permitted to 
profit from his own wrong supersedes the applicable statutes). 
 7. FISH, supra note 4, at 280. 




With this in mind, consider Wittgenstein: 
   A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign post leave no doubt open 
about the way I have to go?  Does it shew which direction I am to take when I 
have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country?  But 
where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its 
finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one?—And if there were, not a single sign-post, 
but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground— is there only one 
way of interpreting them?—So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no 
room for doubt.  Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes 
not.  And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical 
one.8
Without a practice of following it—a way of acting—the signpost, by 
itself, leaves considerable room for doubt.  There are as many potential 
ways of following the signpost as there are possible conventions for 
determining how it is to be used and what counts as following it.  But 
once a convention for following signposts is adopted, a background of 
understanding evolves.  It is against this background that the need for 
interpretation arises. 
In explicating understanding, interpretation is a nonstarter.  Even if we 
were to grant the interpretivist his premise that all understanding 
involves interpretation, the interpretivist position collapses on its own 
terms.  If all understanding is interpretation, then all interpretation is 
itself in need of interpretation.  That is, if understanding a rule, symbol, 
or sign is a matter of an act of interpretation standing between the 
interpreter and the thing interpreted, there is no reason why this same 
logic should not apply to the interpretation itself.  Wittgenstein’s point is 
not to deny understanding.  Rather, his argument is that interpretation 
cannot explicate the very idea of understanding because it gives rise to 
an infinite regress of interpretations (the Regress Argument).9  In the 
end, interpretation obscures rather than illuminates the phenomenon of 
human understanding. 
In addition to the infinite Regress Argument, Wittgenstein advances a 
second argument, what Meredith Williams calls the “Paradox of 
Interpretation.”10  First, Wittgenstein: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.  The 
answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can 
also be made out to conflict with it.  And so there would be neither accord nor 
conflict here.11
 8. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 85. 
 9. Id. at §§ 141, 198 (introducing the Regress Argument in two places). 
 10. MEREDITH WILLIAMS, WITTGENSTEIN, MIND AND MEANING 160 (1999). 
 11. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 201. 
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The Regress Argument undercuts our ability to prefer one interpretation 
over another.  By contrast, the Paradox of Interpretation argument shows 
that no matter what action we deem “correct,” we can interpret the rule 
in question in such a way that the action can be made either to accord 
with the rule or not.  Williams sums up the situation thus: 
The Regress Argument shows that the view of objectified meaning as embodied 
in decision, formula, or any other candidate for the role cannot account for the 
necessity of rules, for the fact that rules constrain the behavior of the agent.  The 
Paradox shows that the view cannot account for the normativity of rules, for the 
fact that there is a substantive distinction between correct and incorrect.  There 
is nothing in the mind of the agent or in the behavior of the agent that shows 
what rule he is following, so long as we think of rules as embodying objectified 
meaning.  In sum, there is no explanatory role (via the Paradox) nor epistemic 
role (via the Regress) for objectified meaning to play.12
If interpretation is a dead end, how do we explain the fact that we do 
understand signposts and that we do grasp the requirements of all sorts 
of norms (that is, follow rules)?  Wittgenstein rejects the idea of 
interpretation as a necessary mediating device between a rule and our 
grasp of its requirements.  His point is not only that interpretation is a 
logically incoherent explanation of understanding.  He goes further, arguing 
against the very picture of understanding embraced by interpretivists.  
For Wittgenstein, nothing stands between a rule and what counts as 
following a rule (that is, correct action).  And yet, we still do not have a 
clear picture of the nature of understanding.  Precisely what, we may still 
ask, does understanding consist of? 
Wittgenstein’s answer is twofold: technique13 and practice.14  We 
show our understanding of a concept when we use the concept correctly.  
The “giving of a correct explanation is a criterion of understanding.”15  
 12. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 161. 
 13. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 199 (“To understand a language means to be 
[the] master of a technique.”). 
 14. G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, 2 WITTGENSTEIN: RULES, GRAMMAR AND NECESSITY 
136 (1985). 
 15. G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, WITTGENSTEIN: UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING 
667 (1980). 
[G]iving a correct explanation is a criterion of understanding, while the 
explanation given is a standard for the correct use of the expression explained.  
Correspondingly, using an expression in accordance with correct explanations 
of it is a criterion of understanding, while understanding an expression 
presupposes the ability to explain it. 
Id.  Thus, when a lawyer is asked why two persons are required to witness a will, the 
connection between attestation and validity will be explicated, thereby demonstrating the 
lawyer’s understanding of the concepts. 




Correct understanding is not a function of something that goes on in our 
head (for example, a private act of interpretation or translation).  Concept 
possession is the demonstrated ability to participate in the manifold 
activities in which the concept is employed (for example, rule following).16
Interpretation is a nonstarter because interpretation draws our attention 
away from the techniques that make understanding possible.  Correct 
and incorrect forms of action are immanent in practices.  Thus, correct 
forms of action cannot be imposed on a practice, by interpretation or 
otherwise.  It is only when we master the techniques employed by 
participants in a practice that we can grasp the distinction between 
correct and incorrect action.17
But where does this leave interpretation?  If understanding—knowing 
how to engage in a practice—is exhibited in action, what role is there 
for interpretation?  Again, Wittgenstein is instructive here.  When it 
comes to interpretation, we can see that interpretation depends upon 
understanding—unreflective action—already being in place.18  We should, as 
Wittgenstein argues, “restrict the term ‘interpretation’ to the substitution 
of one expression of the rule for another.”19 Interpretation is an 
activity—one that not only depends upon understanding already being in 
place, but an activity that is actuated by a breakdown or failure in 
understanding.  In short, interpretation is a therapeutic, not foundational, 
activity. 
III.  UNDERSTANDING LAW: THE GRAMMAR OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I have argued that interpretation is an activity that depends upon 
understanding.  I have said that understanding—be it of law or any other 
human practice—is a matter of being the master of a technique.  But 
what is the technique grasped by a competent practitioner of law, and in 
what does mastery of such technique consist? 
 16. See WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 176. 
The rule as formula, the standard as chart, or the paradigm as an instance have 
no normative or representational status in their own right.  They have this 
status only in virtue of the way the formula or the chart or the instance is 
used.  It is the use that creates the structured context within which sign-posts 
point, series can be continued, orders obeyed and paradigms be exemplary.  
Only then can we see a particular action as embodying or instancing a 
grammatical structure.  In short, the mandatory stage setting is social practice. 
Id. 
 17. See ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT 13 (1994) (“[T]he meaning of 
a linguistic expression must determine how it would be correct to use it in various 
contexts.  To understand or grasp such a meaning is to be able to distinguish correct from 
incorrect uses.”). 
 18. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 219 (“When I obey a rule, I do not chose.  I obey 
the rule blindly.”). 
 19. Id. at § 201. 
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The nerve of law is argument.  Facility in legal argument is the 
measure of the degree to which one has mastered the grammar of 
justification that is central to the practice of law.  The grammar of legal 
argument is immanent in the practice of law.  By immanent, I mean to 
say that law is an intersubjective practice wherein participants coordinate 
their behavior through the employment of a grammar of appraisal that is 
a constitutive feature of the practice itself.20
The fundamental form of expression in law is assertion.  Argument in 
law begins with an assertion that something is the case—true—as a 
matter of law.  Everything from a claim that a statute is unconstitutional 
to averment that a contract is unenforceable are all examples of legal 
assertions, claims that the purported proposition is true as a matter of 
law. 
Lawyers appraise the truth and falsity of legal assertions through 
forms of legal argument.  The forms of argument are themselves neither 
true nor false.  Rather, the forms of legal argument are the means by 
which lawyers show the truth and falsity of legal propositions.21  The 
forms of argument are the grammar of legal argument.  They are 
immanent in the sense that they make possible the assertion of claims for 
the truth of legal propositions which are then disputed, evaluated, and 
judged by all who are competent in their use (technique).22
There are six forms of legal argument in the American system of law.  
While some are more familiar than others in different departments of 
law,23 these six forms comprise a complete list of the argumentative 
tools of American law.  The forms of argument in law are: 
Textual: taking the words of an authoritative legal text (e.g., a  
constitution, statute, contract or trust) at face value, i.e., in   
accordance with their ordinary meaning; 
 20. In short, I agree with Jules Coleman that law is a conventional practice 
“sustained by the behavior of participants.”  JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF 
PRINCIPLE 99 (2001).  I believe an account of the forms of argument, and the way the 
forms of argument are used to show the truth of legal propositions, is the best 
explanation of the practice of law. 
 21. “[P]ropositions of law are typically statements not of what ‘law’ is but of what 
the law is, i.e. what the law of some system permits or requires or empowers people to 
do.”  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 247 (2d ed. 1994). 
 22. Robert Brandom describes well the project of joining the assertoric and the 
normative.  See BRANDOM, supra note 17, at 167 (“What is it we are doing when we 
assert, claim, or declare something?”). 
 23. The phrase “departments of Law” is Dworkin’s.  See DWORKIN, supra note 1, 
at 250–54. 




Doctrinal: applying rules generated from previously decided cases  
(precedents); 
Historical/Intentional: relying on the intentions of the Framers  
(constitution), legislature (statute), or parties to an agreement  
(contract); 
Prudential: weighing or assessing the consequences (in terms of 
“costs”) of a particular rule; 
Structural: inferring rules from relationships created by the structures  
created by the Constitution or statute; and 
Ethical: deriving rules from the moral ethos established by the  
Constitution or by statute.24
I have said that the forms of legal argument in the American practice 
of law are employed to show the truth and falsity of legal propositions.  
While this is certainly true, I need to say more about the argumentative 
framework within which the forms of legal argument are immanent.  
Once this structure is articulated, I can then explicate the nature of 
understanding in law as a prelude to my discussion of the role of 
interpretation in law. 
As mentioned, legal argument begins in assertion.  An assertion in law 
is a claim that a given proposition is true as a matter of law.  Consider this 
proposition: p = “The contract between Smith and Jones is unenforceable.”  I 
will call this proposition a Claim because it is asserted as a correct or 
true proposition.  Before we can assess the truth or falsity of the Claim, 
we need to know what it is about the contract between Smith and Jones 
that might lead one to assert that the contract is unenforceable. 
What we seek is a Ground, a reason (for example, a fact) that connects 
the Claim of unenforceability with some aspect or feature of the contract 
by virtue of which the contract is allegedly unenforceable.  Suppose 
Smith is fourteen years of age.  This fact is the Ground for the Claim that 
the contract is unenforceable.  But what is it that makes this so?  In other 
words, in virtue of what are the Claim and Ground joined such that the 
Ground supports the Claim (that is, makes it true)? 
The answer to this last question is a Warrant.  The Warrant makes the 
Ground significant vis-à-vis the Claim.  The Warrant is the means by 
 24. The six forms of argument in American law, paraphrased in modern terms 
here, were first explicated by Philip Bobbitt.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).  Structural argument in the constitutional context was 
first articulated by Charles Black.  See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND 
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). 
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which we can say with certainty that the Ground is a legally relevant 
reason for concluding that the Claim is true as a matter of law.  But 
Warrants are not self executing.  For Warrrants to be meaningful, there 
must be ways of construing Warrants that make Warrants meaningful.  I 
shall refer to these as Backings. 
The forms of legal argument are the Backings for Warrants, the 
grammar of legal justification with which we show the truth and falsity 
of Claims from the legal point of view.  The following schema depicts 















                  BACKINGS 
Forms of Argument: 
Textual; Doctrinal; Historical; 








With this schema in view, let us work through the 
is a true proposition of law.  Obviously, Smith’s statu
Ground for the Claim that p is true.  If the Claim aro
where the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is d
controlling law on this question, a textual argument 
 25. The framework that follows (Claim, Ground, Warrant, B
STEPHEN E. TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING
approach was originally advanced in STEPHEN EDELSTON TO
ARGUMENT (1958). 695 
question whether p 
s as a minor is the 
se in a jurisdiction 
eemed to be the 
that references the 
ackings) is taken from 
 23–67 (1979).  The 
ULMIN, THE USES OF 




operative provision26 would be sufficient to show the truth of p.  In 
addition to the relevant Restatement text, there would no doubt be 
precedent construing the rule in question (doctrinal argument), noting 
exceptions, and describing qualifications.  Taken together, the textual 
and doctrinal arguments show the truth of p.  It is through the use of 
these forms of argument that we are able to say that p is true. 
The normativity of law—the distinction between correct and incorrect 
assertions—is a matter of the proper use of the forms of legal argument.  
The forms of argument are the (immanent) grammar of legal justification.  
Understanding in law is best explained as a disposition on the part of 
individuals to employ the forms of argument in appropriate ways as 
context requires.27  The normativity of law assures objectivity in legal 
judgment.28  Meaning—the basis of objectivity—is made possible by the 
harmony in action and judgment of participants in legal practice over 
time.  Most importantly, it is in virtue of what participants in legal 
practice have in common29 that normativity and objectivity are possible. 
IV.  INTERPRETATION IN LAW 
Interpretation is a constitutive feature of legal practice.  Notwithstanding 
its importance within legal practice, interpretation is an activity that is 
dependent on understanding already being in place.  The need for 
interpretation arises when our conventional ways of understanding break 
down.  This occurs, in law, when our use of the forms of legal argument 
“is in some way rendered problematic and thrown in doubt.”30  How 
does understanding in law break down, and how does interpretation 
serve to repair the fabric of understanding? 
Lawyers use the forms of argument to appraise claims about what is 
true as a matter of law.  In many cases (we may call them easy cases), 
the relevant forms of argument all point to a single conclusion.  But the 
forms of argument do conflict, and, when they do, the tension must be 
 26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981) (describing capacity 
to contract). 
 27. Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 177 (describing a disposition as the ability to 
act appropriately under the circumstances). 
 28. See Dennis Patterson, Normativity and Objectivity in Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 325, 356 (2001) (showing how normativity arises from a practice of argument with 
criteria for appraising assertions). 
 29. Of course, this is directly contrary to the argument made by Ronald Dworkin.  
See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 250–54 (showing the compartmentalization of the 
departments of law); Postema, supra note 1, at 283, 288–89 (making the case for the 
intersubjective nature of understanding). 
 30. James Tully, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: Understanding Practices 
of Critical Reflection, in THE GRAMMAR OF POLITICS: WITTGENSTEIN AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 17, 39 (Cressida J. Heyes ed., 2003). 
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resolved.  Resolving this tension is the activity of legal interpretation.31  
It is in the act of interpretation that the fabric of law is repaired, thereby 
enabling practitioners to go on with the practice.  I shall now discuss 
three cases to illustrate these points. 
A.  Statutory Interpretation 
Let us start with a case familiar to all students of legal theory, Riggs v. 
Palmer.32  Having executed a valid will, Francis Palmer intended to 
leave the bulk of his estate to his grandson, Elmer.33  Upon the remarriage 
of his widower grandfather, Elmer feared he would lose his inheritance.34  
To prevent this turn of events, Elmer killed his grandfather by poison.35
There was no dispute about the requisite statute at the center of issue 
in the case.  The New York Statute of Wills articulated what all probate 
statutes required: where there is a valid will, a dead testator, and a 
named beneficiary, the latter is given the testator’s property according to 
the dictates of the will.36  The proposition of law to which the parties 
gave their attention is simple: Elmer is entitled to his grandfather’s 
property in accordance with the dictates of his grandfather’s will.  Elmer’s 
argument was grounded in the language of the New York Statute of 
Wills.37  Before we consider the arguments for and against the asserted 
proposition of law, a few preliminary remarks are in order.  They 
concern the concept of understanding and its relationship to the forms of 
argument discussed earlier.  As argued above, understanding is exhibited 
by participants in legal practice in the unreflective employment of forms 
of argument to show the truth of legal propositions.  To see this, 
consider a case where murder is not an element of the facts—the normal 
probate context.  Once validated by the probate court, the will of the 
testator dictates the devolution of property of the testator.  This 
requirement is gleaned from a straightforward reading of the Statute of 
Wills.  In short, textual argument is sufficient to show the truth of the 
proposition that the beneficiary of a valid will is to be given property in 
 31. Conflict among the forms of argument is a significant but not exhaustive 
aspect of interpretation in law. 
 32. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 189. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 




accordance with the dictates of the will.  What turns a case of understanding 
into one where the need for interpretation arises? 
The need for interpretation is actuated by facts.  In Riggs, the actuating 
fact was the murder of the testator by his grandson.  But why is this fact 
an actuating event?  Not only does the majority opinion show why the 
murder actuates the need for interpretation, the opinion shows how the 
state of the law explains the legal (that is, interpretive) significance of 
the murder.  In other words, we need to explain how understanding (that 
is, the unreflective act of probating the will in the normal course of 
things) broke down as the court tried to come to terms with the 
significance of the murder as the event that precipitated the breakdown 
in understanding. 
The majority opinion in Riggs is a sophisticated doctrinal argument.  
As Professor Dworkin has taught us, the opinion makes good use of the 
common law maxim: no man shall profit from his own wrong.38  But 
there is more to the opinion than mere recitation of an equitable maxim.  
When we look at the ways in which Judge Earl showed the true state of 
the law, we see why the facts themselves make it clear that a 
straightforward reading of the requisite statute was all but impossible. 
The majority opinion begins in classic fashion with the distinction 
between law and equity.  The distinction is embraced in full measure by 
the common law systems of both the United States and England and can 
be traced back to Aristotle.  The sheer breadth and diversity of classic 
writers on the role of equity39 within all departments of law should cause 
an educated legal mind to experience a sense of unease when confronted 
with the facts in Riggs. 
Having shown how the no man shall profit from his own wrong 
principle is a constitutive feature of law in the most general way (that is, 
the law and equity distinction), Judge Earl then demonstrated the reach 
of the principle throughout varied departments of law.  Citing cases from 
the law of wills and insurance, Earl made a strong case for the 
proposition that precedents both directly on point (that is, the law of 
wills), as well as those from related departments of law, support an 
exception to the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute.  That is, 
Earl made a doctrinal argument to the effect that the words of a valid 
legislative enactment (here, the Statute of Wills) are to be given their 
normal force and effect unless there is some exception demonstrated by 
the facts.  In short, Judge Earl did not change the law; he clarified it (by 
 38. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14–45 (1977); DWORKIN, 
supra note 1, at 15–20. 
 39. In its opinion, the majority cites Puffendorf, Bacon, and Blackstone, among 
other legal thinkers.  Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189. 
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pointing to an underlying and well-established legal principle).40
By contrast, Judge Gray, in dissent, argued for a straightforward 
reading of the words of the statute.  Claiming that the court was “bound 
by the rigid rules of law,”41 Gray argued that Elmer is being twice 
punished for his offense.42  In a clever rebuttal to Judge Gray, the majority 
pointed out that he begged the question of whether Elmer was entitled to 
receive his victim’s property under the will.  The point was that the very 
question before the court was whether the property rightfully belonged 
to Elmer or not.  Judge Gray did not seem to notice his error. 
What does Riggs teach us about interpretation in law?  First, in terms 
of the forms of argument, it is clear that without the complicating factor 
of the murder of the testator, the textual argument is decisive.  Without 
the murder of the testator, it is true as a matter of law that Elmer was 
entitled to receive his grandfather’s property according to the dictates of 
the Statute of Wills.  It is only when the complication of the murder is 
added to the facts that lawyers dispute the true state of the law. 
How did Judge Earl persuade enough of his colleagues to see the law 
as he did?  Three factors suggest themselves.  First, the majority opinion 
did no damage to the existing state of the law.  I will call this the 
interpretive principle of minimal mutilation.43  In other words, deciding 
against Elmer did not put in question the efficacy of any other element 
of the New York Statute of Wills.  Second, through its decision, the 
majority demonstrated that its conclusion was consistent with everything 
else it knew to be true about the law of wills.  I shall refer to this as 
coherence.44  Finally, the opinion shows how a decision against Elmer 
comports with similar decisions in other departments of law.  I shall 
 40. See FISH, supra note 4, at 327 (“Interpretation is not the art of construing but 
the art of constructing.”). 
 41. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191 (Gray, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 193 (“[T]o concede appellants’ views would involve the imposition of an 
additional punishment or penalty upon [Elmer].”) (Gray, J., dissenting). 
 43. See W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 66–67 (2d ed. 1978) 
(discussing the virtue of conservatism).  See also GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH JARVIS 
THOMSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY 12 (1996) (“It is rational to 
make the least change in one’s view that is necessary in order to obtain greater coherence 
in what one believes.”) (citations omitted).  Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 147 (1994) (discussing reasoned elaboration).   
 44. The idea of coherence is apt.  See CONAL CONDREN, THE STATUS AND APPRAISAL 
OF CLASSIC TEXTS 148 (1985) (“[A]t its most general level, coherence refers to the ways in 
which parts are interconnected to form a whole; and at a similar level of generality, the 
appraisive category of coherence is an abridgment of the range of questions one asks of a 
text in terms of its parts and the closeness of their interrelationships.”). 




refer to this aspect as generality.45  Taken together, minimal mutilation, 
coherence, and generality are the three aspects of the majority’s opinion 
that support the notion that its interpretation of the law is more 
persuasive than that offered by the dissenting opinion. 
More important than the particulars of the majority and dissenting 
opinions is the fact that neither advanced any theory of legal interpretation.  
Of course, it is always possible to elevate a form of argument into a 
theory if that means relentless adherence to a single form of argument.46  
However, the move to theory hides the tension felt by practitioners of 
law as they struggle to persuade one another that their choice of how to 
go on with the practice is correct.  To see such a struggle as a competition of 
theories obscures this important aspect of the practice. 
B.  Contract Law 
The discernment of legal meaning is a fundamental feature of law.  
Contracts, trusts, wills, and constitutions all come to us in the form of 
written instruments.  How lawyers construe texts to decide their meaning 
is a complex and sophisticated undertaking.  Interestingly, the forms of 
argument—previously explained as the means by which lawyers show 
the truth of legal propositions—are the same whether the document is a 
contract or a constitution.  In fact, it was the existence of the forms of 
argument at common law that made the American innovation of a 
written constitution workable.47
Contracts usually take the form of a writing because the parties wish 
to hold one another to their bargain.  But sometimes the writing—no 
matter how clear it may be—fails to settle the question of the parties’ 
agreement.  C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. is 
illustrative.48  A building owned by an Iowa corporation whose president 
was a farmer was burglarized.  The thieves made off with chemicals, office 
equipment, and shop equipment valued at approximately $10,000.49  The 
stolen chemicals, which constituted the bulk of the value of the lost 
items, had been stored in a locked interior room in the warehouse.50  
 45. QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 43, at 73 (“The wider the range of application of 
a hypothesis, the more general it is.”). 
 46. For an exquisite example see MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE 179–87 
(1988) (reducing all the forms of constitutional argument to prudential argument).  For 
discussion of this point, see Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233 
(1989) (reviewing TUSHNET, supra). 
 47. See CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 24, at 5 (“Since the Constitution 
was a written law, it had to be construed, and this was to be done according to the 
prevailing methods of legal construction.”). 
 48. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). 
 49. Id. at 171. 
 50. Id. 
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Interestingly, there were no visible marks on the exterior of the building, 
nor was there any sign of tampering upon the Plexiglas door to the 
warehouse.  The court described the facts as follows: 
   There were truck tire tread marks visible in the mud in the driveway leading to 
and from the plexiglas door entrance to the warehouse.  It was demonstrated this 
door could be forced open without leaving visible marks or physical damage. 
   There were no visible marks on the exterior of the building made by tools, 
explosives, electricity or chemicals, and there was no physical damage to the 
exterior of the building to evidence felonious entry into the building by force 
and violence.51
The insurance policy defined burglary as: 
[T]he felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from within the premises by 
a person making felonious entry therein by actual force and violence, of which 
force and violence there are visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity 
or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the premises at the 
place of such entry.52
Following the text of the insurance policy, this loss was not covered, 
as the burglar left no visible marks on the exterior door.  And yet, the 
Iowa Supreme Court held to the contrary.  Its reason for doing so is a 
lesson in the art of interpretation in law. 
The dissent makes the obvious textual argument: “We may not—at 
least we should not—by any accepted standard of construction meddle 
with contracts which clearly and plainly state their meaning simply 
because we dislike that meaning, even in the case of insurance 
policies.”53  In contract law, due to the emphasis on writing, textual 
argument often enjoys supremacy among the forms of argument.  And 
yet, there are many examples where the plain meaning of the text yields 
to other considerations. 
The majority opinion evinces no lack of appreciation for the power of 
textual argument.54  But the majority uses an historical argument to 
make the case—ultimately persuasive—that the specific language of the 
contract cannot control the ultimate decision of what rights the parties 
have under their agreement.  In constitutional law, and in the interpretation 
of statutes, appeal is made to the announced intentions of ratifiers or 
legislators in interpreting the present meaning of constitutional or 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (quoting trial court) (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. at 183 (LeGrand, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 173–75. 




legislative provisions.  Where circumstances change, the outcome of 
decisions may well be different from those originally contemplated. 
In characterizing the nature of the contractual process, the majority 
writes: “[m]any of our principles for resolving conflicts relating to 
written contracts were formulated at an early time when parties of equal 
strength negotiated in the historical sequence of offer, acceptance, and 
reduction to writing.  The concept that both parties assented to the 
resulting document had solid footing in fact.”55  But the course of history 
moved away from the era of parties of equal strength bargaining freely.  
It is this historical change that, in the view of the majority, merits an 
outcome not contemplated by a mere reading of the contractual text.56
The great change that underlies the majority’s historical argument is 
the rise of standard form contracts.57  Presented on a take it or leave it 
basis, insurance contracts present the buyer in need of coverage with no 
options and no ability to negotiate terms (for example, the definition of 
burglary) or any other material element of the contract.  The contract is, 
in effect, composed of boilerplate terms to which there is no real assent 
at all. 
Owing to the fact that terms cannot be negotiated, purchasers of 
policies rarely read the terms of the document with care.  Of course, any 
purchaser of insurance will have reasonable expectations about the 
scope and limits of coverage.  These expectations, the majority argued, 
require a different approach to the question whether the purchaser 
assented to the terms offered in the insurance policy.  The majority 
concluded, because of the fact “that modern insurance companies have 
turned to mass advertising to sell ‘protection’”58 that the law required 
that the “reasonable expectations” with respect to coverage be of greater 
importance than the ordinary meaning of contract terms.59
How did the majority resolve the conflict between the textual and 
historical arguments?  First, the court showed how the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations is an established feature of insurance law,60 
thereby demonstrating coherence within the immediate department of 
law.  Minimal mutilation and coherence are both at work, building a 
persuasive interpretation.  But the real strength in the majority’s interpretive 
argument is generality.  The majority opinion convinces by showing 
 55. Id. at 173. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 178. 
 59. Id. at 176.  However, the majority did make the point that the record 
demonstrated no actual knowledge of the restrictive definition of burglary in the policies.  
See id. at 176–77.  Had such knowledge been shown, the result might well have been 
different. 
 60. Id. at 176–77. 
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how the strategy of argument that it employs in the instant case is 
consistent with what courts are doing in other departments of law.  From 
common law sales contracts61 to common law leases62 to transactions 
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,63 the majority used 
decisions64 from various departments of law to make the case that the 
present decision fit within a wide fabric of decisions.  It is the feature of 
generality that enables the majority opinion to favor the historical 
argument over its textual counterpart. 
C.  Constitutional Law 
In the American legal system, no department of law is more contested 
than constitutional law.  Theories of constitutional law are numerous and 
wide ranging.  Notwithstanding the plethora of theoretical approaches to 
constitutional law, there is general consensus that the forms of argument 
outlined above are the grammar for advancement and assessment of 
constitutional claims.65
I will discuss a single opinion of the United States Supreme Court to 
illustrate the claims made earlier regarding the forms of argument and 
the role of interpretation in law.  While questions in constitutional law 
are often unique, there is nothing special about the forms of argument in 
constitutional law.  As mentioned earlier, the forms of argument at 
common law were the very thing that enabled the early Supreme Court 
to interpret the written Constitution.  Thus, everything we learn about 
interpretation in constitutional law is, ceteris paribus, equally applicable 
to other departments of law. 
The late nineteen twenties through the nineteen thirties were a time of 
great economic turbulence in the United States.  Over the course of a 
decade, state legislatures were repeatedly called upon to stave off the 
harsh effects of economic depression and widespread fiscal misery.  
Particularly hard hit by financial crises were American citizens in the 
middle class, who saw their very ability to shelter their families put at 
 61. Id. at 178. 
 62. Id. at 179. 
 63. Id. at 179–80 (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 93 
(N.J. 1960)). 
 64. The majority cited both Iowa precedents and persuasive precedents from other 
jurisdictions.  Id. at 178–79. 
 65. See THOMAS E. BAKER & JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 307–36 
(2d ed. 2003); PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN & AKHIL REED AMAR, 
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 33 (4th ed. 2000). 




risk.  In 1933, the Minnesota Legislature passed the Mortgage Moratorium 
Law.  In an effort to mitigate the harsh effects of numerous mortgage 
foreclosures, the Mortgage Moratorium Law extended the period of time 
for redemption of property for up to two years, to May 1, 1935.66
 66. The pertinent section of the statute reads: 
   Sec. 4.  Period of Redemption May be Extended.—Where any mortgage 
upon real property has been foreclosed and the period of redemption has not 
yet expired, or where a sale is hereafter had, in the case of real estate mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings, now pending, or which may hereafter be instituted 
prior to the expiration of two years from and after the passage of this Act, or 
upon the sale of any real property under any judgment or execution where the 
period of redemption has not yet expired, or where such sale is made hereafter 
within two years from and after the passage of this Act, the period of 
redemption may be extended for such additional time as the court may deem 
just and equitable but in no event beyond May 1st, 1935; provided that the 
mortgagor, or the owner in possession of said property, in the case of mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings, or the judgment debtor, in case of sale under judgment, or 
execution, shall prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, apply to the 
district court having jurisdiction of the matter, on not less than 10 days’ written 
notice to the mortgagee or judgment creditor, or the attorney of either, as the 
case may be, for an order determining the reasonable value of the income on 
said property, or, if the property has no income, then the reasonable rental 
value of the property involved in such sale, and directing and requiring such 
mortgagor or judgment debtor, to pay all or a reasonable part of such income 
or rental value, in or toward the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage 
or judgment indebtedness at such times and in such manner as shall be fixed 
and determined and ordered by the court; and the court shall thereupon hear 
said application and after such hearing shall make and file its order directing 
the payment by such mortgagor, or judgment debtor, of such an amount at such 
times and in such manner as to the court shall, under all the circumstances, 
appear just and equitable. Provided that upon the service of the notice or 
demand aforesaid that the running of the period of redemption shall be tolled 
until the court shall make its order upon such application.  Provided, further, 
however, that if such mortgagor or judgment debtor, or personal representative, 
shall default in the payments, or any of them, in such order required, on his 
part to be done, or commits waste, his right to redeem from said sale shall 
terminate 30 days after such default and holders of subsequent liens may 
redeem in the order and manner now provided by law beginning 30 days after 
the filing of notice of such default with the clerk of such District Court, and his 
right to possession shall cease and the party acquiring title to any such real 
estate shall then be entitled to the immediate possession of said premises.  If 
default is claimed by allowance of waste, such 30 day period shall not begin to 
run until the filing of an order of the court finding such waste.  Provided, 
further, that the time of redemption from any real estate mortgage foreclosure 
or judgment or execution sale heretofore made, which otherwise would expire 
less than 30 days after the passage and approval of this Act, shall be and the 
same hereby is extended to a date 30 days after the passage and approval of 
this Act, and in such case, the mortgagor, or judgment debtor, or the assigns or 
personal representative of either, as the case may be, or the owner in the 
possession of the property, may, prior to said date, apply to said court for and 
the court may thereupon grant the relief as hereinbefore and in this section 
provided. Provided, further, that prior to May 1, 1935, no action shall be 
maintained in this state for a deficiency judgment until the period of 
redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended under the provisions of 
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In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, the United States 
Supreme Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law.67  Pursuant to the statute, the 
Blaisdells applied for an extension of the redemption period on the 
foreclosure of a mortgage they had given on land they owned in 
Minneapolis.68  The mortgage had been properly foreclosed: the appellant 
and mortgagee was the purchaser of the mortgage at the foreclosure 
sale.69  The Blaisdells applied for relief under the statute prior to the 
running of the period of equitable redemption, the time during which 
they were legally permitted to retain ownership of land by paying the 
mortgagee/purchaser the sum of $3,700.98.70  The reasonable value of 
the property, the Court stated, “greatly exceeded the amount due on the 
mortgage including all liens, costs and expenses.”71
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Minnesota statute, finding the statute to be a constitutionally permissible 
exercise of Minnesota’s police power.72  The question of the statute’s 
constitutionality hinged on the question of whether or not the statute 
violated the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.73  In the end, a 
divided U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Minnesota statute was 
constitutional.  There is much in the opinion to be learned about 
constitutional interpretation and the role of the forms of argument in 
showing the truth of propositions of law. 
The Court put the question as one of “the relation of emergency to 
constitutional power”74 and began with the observation that “[w]hile 
emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion 
this Act, has expired. 
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 417 n.1 (1934) (quoting 
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, ch. 339 § 4, 1933 Minn. Laws 514). 
 67. Id. at 415–16. 
 68. Id. at 418–19. 
 69. Id. at 419. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 420. 
 73. Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 reads: 
No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters 
of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but 
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any 
Title of Nobility. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 74. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425. 




for the exercise of power.”75  In deciding the scope and limits of power, 
the Court must discern the proper relationship between the power sought 
to be exercised and constitutional limits on that exercise of power.  For 
this, the Court needed to construct the meaning of the Contract Clause.  
To do this, the Court turned to the forms of legal argument. 
The majority began with an historical narrative.  History tells us why 
the ratifiers or framers propounded a constitutional clause and what 
purpose that clause was meant to serve.  The majority maintained that 
notwithstanding the failure of a clear answer to emerge from the debates 
in the Constitutional Convention, there could be no doubt as to the 
reasons which led to adoption of the clause.  The Court explained: 
The widespread distress following the revolutionary period, and the plight of 
debtors, had called forth in the States an ignoble array of legislative schemes for 
the defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations.  Legislative 
interferences had been so numerous and extreme that the confidence essential to 
prosperous trade had been undermined and the utter destruction of credit was 
threatened. . . .  The occasion and general purpose of the contract clause are 
summed up in the terse statement of Chief Justice Marshall in Ogden v. Saunders, 
12 Wheat. pp. 213, 354, 355: “The power of changing the relative situation of 
debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to 
every man, touches the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual 
in those things which he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive management, 
had been used to such an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the 
ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man.  
This mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial 
intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the 
people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith.  To guard against the continuance 
of the evil was an object of deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as the 
virtuous, of this great community, and was one of the important benefits expected 
from a reform of the government.”76
This history runs directly counter to the decision the Court ultimately 
reached.  In this regard, the dissenting opinion—written by Justice 
Sutherland—is particularly instructive.  Sutherland was adamant that the 
historical form of argument was decisive in answering the question of 
the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute.  In constructing the meaning 
of the Constitution, Justice Sutherland argued: “[t]he whole aim of 
construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is to discover 
the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its framers and 
the people who adopted it.”77  Constitutional interpretation is a matter of 
“plac[ing] ourselves in the condition of those who framed and adopted 
it.”78  Doing so, Sutherland maintained, “will demonstrate conclusively 
 75. Id. at 426. 
 76. Id. at 427–28. 
 77. Id. at 453 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (citing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 
662, 670 (1889)). 
 78. Id. (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887). 
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that [the Contract Clause] was framed and adopted with the specific and 
studied purpose of preventing legislation designed to relieve debtors 
especially in time of financial distress.”79
The weight of history, so thoroughly recited by Justice Sutherland in 
dissent, meant that the majority opinion had to persuade on some 
basis other than history.  For this, Chief Justice Hughes employed a variety 
of forms of argument to show why the Minnesota statute survived 
constitutional challenge.  His primary arguments were two: doctrinal and 
prudential.  First, ample precedent exists for the proposition that “the 
protective power of the State, its police power, may be exercised—without 
violating the true intent of the provision of the Federal Constitution—in 
directly preventing the immediate and literal enforcement of contractual 
obligations, by a temporary and conditional restraint, where vital public 
interests would otherwise suffer.” 80  The example Hughes provided was 
a series of New York cases where the state extended the periods for 
residential leases during a housing crisis as long as current residents paid 
“a reasonable rent or price for their use and occupation.”81  These cases 
set the stage for the majority’s most important argument: the prudential 
argument. 
Finding an emergency existing in Minnesota, the Court granted that 
the end sought by the State is worthy of protection.  But the key question 
was the means.  Could the Court have found that the end of “protection of a 
basic interest of society”82 could be accomplished without compromising 
the Court’s obligation to state the law and not remake it according to its own 
lights?  Having recited a variety of considerations—historical, doctrinal, and 
prudential—Chief Justice Hughes drew the opinion to a conclusive end. 
Taking judicial notice of the emergency condition in Minnesota, the 
majority concluded that the statute was addressed to a legitimate end 
(that is, it was within the police power).  Now Hughes needed to persuade 
that the end sought is legitimate, and that the means employed to achieve 
that end was constitutionally permissible.  His argument is an entirely 
prudential one.  First, he noted that the period of time for extension of 
the period of redemption was not unreasonable.  Second, the integrity of 
 79. Id. (Sutherland, J., dissenting).  Further bolstering his point, Sutherland recited 
a number of nineteenth and twentieth century Supreme Court precedents where the Court 
found debtor relief statutes unconstitutional.  Id. at 465–66 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 440.  This situation, according to the Court, involved debtor relief and 
leases in the context of scarce housing.  See id. at 440–43. 
 81. Id. at 440–41. 
 82. Id. at 445. 




the mortgage interest was in no way impaired.  Third, the mortgagor was 
required to pay the rental value of the land, which amount was added to 
the indebtedness.  Finally, the legislation was temporary, limited to the 
period of the exigency. 
Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion is a model of the interpretive principle 
of minimal mutilation.  Once it had concluded that the police power was 
legitimate, the majority had to decide whether the exercise of that power 
could be accomplished in a way that recognized the power of both the 
textual and historical arguments that were at the center of the dissent.  
The success of the majority’s interpretive argument turned on its ability 
to cabin the ill effects of trampling the clear language of the Contracts 
Clause.  The majority’s appreciation of this was evident in its attempt to 
emphasize the existence of a unique emergency situation and the very 
limited scope of the remedy that the decision afforded the respondents. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Law is a practice of argument.  In the day to day practice of law, legal 
questions often admit of one right answer.  Philosophy clarifies the 
practice of law when it engenders a clear view of the grammar of legal 
argument—the techniques employed by lawyers to settle disputed 
questions within a shared, conventional practice.83
The forms of argument are a central feature of the practice of law.  But 
the forms of legal argument do not answer the question of what is to be 
done when they conflict, thereby engendering the need for interpretation.  
For this, we need to illuminate how it is that lawyers interpret the law 
when the forms of argument pull in opposing directions. 
The forms of argument are immanent in the practice of law.  As we 
have seen, the same is true of interpretation.  The principles of minimal 
mutilation, coherence and generality are the hermeneutic tools of legal 
interpretation.  In bringing these interpretive principles to light, it has not 
been my purpose to argue for a particular theory of interpretation.  
Rather, my aim has been to clarify what we already know and obtain a 
clearer view of what we do when, perforce, we interpret the law. 
Clarity with respect to interpretation in law engenders a deeper 
understanding of the role of argument in law.  Interpretation in law has 
purpose only because the possibility exists that we can persuade others 
 83. Or, as Jules Coleman puts it: “playing the game ‘law’.”  COLEMAN, supra note 
20, at 143.  See also CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 24, at 34 (“[I]f you 
believe the holdings of a court, insofar as they are constructions of the Constitution, are 
not statements about the world, but are moves within a serious game, movements as 
practised [sic] as any classical ballet and yet no less contingent, then reductionism is out 
of the question.”). 
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to embrace our interpretations and that we are, ourselves, likewise capable 
of being persuaded.  Interpretation, while not foundational, is certainly 
essential; without it, we could not preserve the common fabric of beliefs 
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